RODOS Users' Group: Final project report by Sinkko K & Ammann M
2S T U K -A 1 8 3 M a r c h  2 0 0 1
R O D O S  U s e r s '  G r o u p :
F i n a l  p r o j e c t  r e p o r t
C o n t r a c t  N u m b e r :  F I 4 P - C T 9 8 - 0 0 7 5
K. Sinkko, M. Ammann (Eds.)
S T U K  •  S Ä T E I L Y T U R V A K E S K U S  •  S T R Å L S Ä K E R H E T S C E N T R A L E N
R A D I A T I O N  A N D  N U C L E A R  S A F E T Y  A U T H O R I T Y
STUK-A183
3
SINKKO, Kari and AMMANN, Michael, editors. RODOS Users' Group: Final
project report. (STUK-A183). Helsinki 2001, 49 pp. + Appendices 2 pp.
ISBN 951-712-441-4
ISSN 0781-1705
Keywords Decision support systems for nuclear emergency management,
RODOS - Real time On-line DecisiOn Support system
ABSTRACT
Prior to 1998, the development of RODOS, a decision support system designed
for the management of nuclear emergencies, had been carried out almost
entirely by research scientists and engineers. The end-users/operators had
little or no input into this development. To redress this situation, the RODOS
Users Group (RUG) was established in 1998 under a Concerted Action Contract
between the European Commission and STUK. The main objectives of this
group were to encourage the emergency management community to use such a
system, to provide a forum for end-users to share their experience in the use of
such systems and to provide feedback from the end-users to the model and
system developers in regard to operational problems and required
improvements.   The contract, which commenced on 1st September 1998, was
for a period of two years. During this period, RUG established a WWW
homepage, planned and performed two nuclear accident exercises and held
four meetings.
Technically the Web page operated very well. State-of-the-art Internet
technology provided an efficient communication channel at low cost. The
membership of the RUG was, however, too low to maintain a lively and ongoing
discussion in parallel with the RODOS project Web page. This experience would
suggest that it might have been better to have operated a Web page for RUG on
the RODOS project Web-site rather than an independent RUG Web-site.
Exercises based on fixed accident scenarios proved to be an appropriate means
of highlighting issues that needed to be discussed between users and
developers and to stimulate and motivate the end-users to maintain and
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further develop the system. Such exercises also promoted further activity in
the field of emergency management.
The organisation and administration of realistic exercises are time consuming,
laborious and expensive. It is therefore very important that the maximum
benefit is achieved from such exercises. The use of analytical evaluation
methods could be better employed for assessing an exercise and analysing the
results. It would be useful in this context to formulate a framework that could
provide scientific levels of merits and guarantee the full documentation of the
work and effort invested. The workload in designing future exercises for RODOS
could be reduced by taking all opportunities to use RODOS in international
exercises.
Users with expertise and a responsibility in the field of emergency
management have to be familiar with the relevant models used in the decision
support system (DSS). They have also to be aware of the level of reliability of
the calculated results and the limits and conditions applying to the model
predictions. It is therefore essential that good co-operation exists between end-
users and the R&D community developing the system. The RUG provided a
forum for the end-users through which they could communicate their
requirements to the developers, receive advice and demonstrations of the
latest additional features to the system. It is seen essential that the end-user
can contribute to the development of models used in RODOS and other DSSs,
and perhaps in the future, become more involved in the R&D aspects of these
systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The varied emergency response to the Chernobyl nuclear accident
demonstrated the need for internationally accepted procedures and methods to
ensure an integrated and coherent response to possible future accidents. There
was also a need to have a comprehensive and seamless set of models to assess
radiation exposure from different pathways, over different time spans and at
all distances, both near and far from the accident site. To provide such models,
the European Commission endorsed and funded a project for the development
of RODOS, a Real-time On-line Decision Support system (Ehrhardt and Weis,
2000).
RODOS has been developed to provide consistent and comprehensive support
for off-site nuclear emergency management. Comprehensive support implies
that RODOS must be able to support a wide variety of experts and decisions-
makers during the various phases of an accident. RODOS can be linked to
radiation monitoring systems and uses a geographical information system to
present radiological data in combination with geographic and demographic
information. Based upon real time monitoring and meteorological data and
using various models it analyses the current and predicts the future
radiological situation (i.e., the distribution in space and time of the released
radioactive material). It simulates the impact of taking protective actions,
such as sheltering, evacuation, relocation, iodine prophylaxis and food bans.
It determines their feasibility and quantifies their benefits and
disadvantages. It is planned that the system will provide support to all
parties involved in emergency management and decision-making, helping
them to explore and develop their judgements and evaluations on
countermeasures.
Decision support systems (DSS) for the management of nuclear emergencies
have been designed and developed almost entirely by an R&D community of
scientists and engineers. There has been little involvement of real end-users.
There was a need to stimulate the use of such systems by operators within the
emergency management community and to reinforce communication and
feedback between these users and the model and system developers in order to
develop a system that better fits the needs of these end-users. It was also
thought that a forum where the end-users could share their experience in the
use of decision support systems was necessary. In 1998 a Concerted Action
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Contract was signed between the European Commission and STUK on the
RODOS Users Group (RUG). The contract started on 1st September and covered
two years. Membership of the RUG consisted of representatives from those
institutes that were responsible for installing, customising and operating the
RODOS system or that had expressed an interest in using the system within
their countries in the near future. Around ten European countries have
participated in the Group.
RUG's activities focused on the application of the RODOS system in emergency
management arrangements. The group organised biannual meetings during
which not only users met other users and shared their experience in the use of
RODOS but also developers were present to listen to the users and discuss their
problems. RUG established a Web site service to offer an open and fast
communication forum for frequently asked questions and to efficiently
distribute information amongst users and also between users and the
development teams. Two exercises were organised to compare the consequence
assessments from RODOS for a hypothetical nuclear accident and to compare
the procedures of emergency management in the participants’ countries. A
fixed release scenario was used in both of the exercises. The focus in the first
exercise was on early phase and near site issues, e.g., near-range dispersion
and early countermeasures. The second exercise dealt with later phase issues
like contamination of the food chain and appropriate countermeasures. The
sharing of experience and know-how in the installation and use of the RODOS
system was an integral part of RUG. It was also important to look at national
emergency arrangements and decision-making procedures to determine how
RODOS fits into this framework and how it could support the decision-making
in each country. Major attention was given to the type of information that is
provided/should be provided to the decision-makers to enable them to make
informed decisions on protective actions.
The secretariat of the RUG was organised and managed by STUK - Radiation
and Nuclear Safety Authority, Finland. The tasks of the secretariat were to
organise and maintain the Web page, to co-ordinate and prepare technical
reports and to provide administrative support during meetings.
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2 OBJECTIVES
The development of the RODOS system within the European Commission’s
Nuclear Fission Safety Programme has stimulated a large-scale collaboration
on nuclear emergency preparedness between organisations in EU-member
states and a number of research institutes in countries of the former Soviet
Union and Central and Eastern Europe. While some organisations from the
emergency management community were directly involved in the development
work, it was seen of paramount importance to broaden the user group, to
promote the operation of the system in emergency centres and to enhance the
system’s applicability for nuclear emergency management.
Since the RODOS system was being developed for use in emergency
management centres, and not just as a research or training tool, it was
important that the emergency management community could have an
influence on the development of the system. RUG was established to enhance
the communication between the end users and, also, between the end users
and the model and system developers. The objective was to share technical
know-how and other experiences gained during the implementation,
customisation and operation of the RODOS system. In particular attention was
focused on issues arising from the operation of RODOS in emergency centres
and in establishing links with radiation monitoring and meteorological
networks. The sharing of knowledge on how best to integrate RODOS into
national emergency management arrangements was also considered
important.
The main objectives of the RUG were:
• to stimulate the communication between model and system developers and
the end users;
• to share technical know-how, software developments and the experience
gained during the implementation, customisation and operation of the
RODOS system, in particular, its remote operation, via networking, at
local/regional/national emergency centres and with remote users, and in
establishing on-line links with radiation monitoring and meteorological
networks;
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• to share experiences encountered in integrating RODOS in the national
emergency management arrangements and development of improved
strategies and structures;
• to identify faults and limitations of the RODOS system during its
commissioning and operation, and to provide feedback to the development
teams;
• to promote the system as a training tool for emergency management, and
its use in nuclear emergencies and exercises;
• to identify where further R&D may be needed to improve the operational
efficacy of  the RODOS system;
• to enhance communication and exchange of experiences between the users
of RODOS and the users of other decision support systems for off-site
nuclear emergency management.
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3 PROGRESS AND RESULTS
In response to the objectives set out in section 2, RUG organised and hosted
biannual meetings of users and potential users to discuss and share
information on different tasks (Minutes 1999A, 1999B, 2000 and 2001). In the
four meetings that were held the discussions concentrated mainly on system
implementation and the application of decision support systems in emergency
management. RODOS developers were invited to attend the meetings to share
their technical knowledge and guidance in the use of RODOS. RUG established a
World Wide Web page to offer an open and fast communication forum for
frequently asked questions and for the distribution of information, technical
reports and RODOS outputs.  This Web site was also open to institutes
interested in the operation of RODOS. RUG co-ordinated, prepared and
distributed various kinds of reports, including proceedings of the meetings and
notes concerning the operation of RODOS. It provided support in organising,
performing and attending regional, national and international emergency
exercises, training courses and elicitation exercises. In addition, RUG provided
an interface with other institutes/emergency centres that are developing or
operating other decision support systems for off-site nuclear emergency
management, e.g. ARGOS NT.
3.1 RUG homepage
In order to enhance communication within both the RUG and RODOS projects
STUK established a Web site service. This offered an open and fast method for
the distribution of information, technical reports and RODOS outputs not only
within the users community but also amongst users and development teams. It
also provided a site for sharing questions and problems relating to RODOS. The
objective was to have a Web site that provided an integrated platform for
sharing different types of information and at the same time was easy-to-
maintain and user-friendly. Conceptually, it consisted of a discussion forum
and a document archive. Announcements on the top page drew the attention to
news and changes to the archive. The graphical user interface of the site
followed HTML-standards.
The discussion forum provided a place where visitors could leave questions,
remarks, opinions, discussion openings etc. The discussion could be divided
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into different topics and contributions were easily made using Web forms
where the user simply wrote the subject for the message and the message body
text and chose the proper discussion group. Anyone with access to the site
could follow the ongoing discussion and was able reply to previous messages.
From the document archive the participants could download files and
documents. Uploading files was easily done with Web forms and files could be
stored in any format. The user simply provided a file name and the path to the
hard-disk where the file was stored, gave the file a descriptive title and
submitted it to the server. Uploaded files were downloadable at once for all
other users. The person who had uploaded the file had the privilege to remove
it from the site. This made it easy to keep the site up-to-date.
Because the RODOS software was still under development it was decided to
restrict access to institutes interested in the operation of RODOS. Hence the site
was protected with user-id and password. There were three levels of access
rights: (1) read and download, (2) read, download and upload and (3)
administrator
3.2 Benchmark exercises
To enhance discussion and to clarify issues of common interest within RUG it
was agreed to analyse and compare the consequence assessments of
hypothetical nuclear accidents using a common release scenario. The main
purpose of this exercise was to stimulate the use of the RODOS system in
participating institutes and to share experience on its installation and use in
emergency centres. Furthermore, it has been recognised that national
emergency arrangements and the decision-making process in different
countries needed to be scrutinised in order to see how the RODOS system could
best support the decision-making.
Two exercises were prepared and conducted. These tabletop exercises provided
a common accident scenario to be run on RODOS by the end users, and served
as a means of highlighting operational problems. The issue of what data
should be presented to the decision-makers was also to be considered. The
accident scenarios were prepared only for use within the RUG. The exercises
were neither planned to be national command post exercises nor to include
decision-makers or higher level advisors. However, where seen appropriate,
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participants were free to interview relevant competent national safety
authorities.
Questions addressed included: at what point in time would the RODOS system
be operated and by whom? Is appropriate input data available, if not, what do
you do? How do you deal with uncertainties? What information is needed by
decision-makers and in which form should this information be presented to
them? What information is needed and requested by parties involved in
emergency management (experts, advisors)?  How would RODOS be used to
provide this support?
The objectives of the exercises can be summarised as:
• to train and improve the skills of users in performing interactive scenario
calculations with the RODOS system; in particular to get familiar with the
input/output interfaces and with the models available within the RODOS
system;
• to study what information is available from  the RODOS system and what
subset thereof should be given to the decision-makers and other parties
involved, and to identify possible requests from crisis teams that are not
available in the present RODOS calculations;
• to enhance and deepen discussion within the RODOS users’ community; in
particular on what information is useful in an accident and in what format
should it be exchanged;
• to clarify the role of the RODOS system in emergency management, e.g. the
advantage of having support in areas that are not so coherently supported
by other tools; and to identify the demands on personnel, infrastructure
and other resources.
The role of the participants in the comparison exercises was to support the
crisis team (experts, decision-makers), i.e. to assess the radiological situation
and provide the crisis team with information concerning protective actions.
The crisis team was assumed to be responsible for preparing recommendations
on protective actions, but not deciding on nor implementing them. The focus
was on the actions that are most efficient in reducing doses e.g. iodine
prophylaxis, sheltering, evacuation and food restrictions.
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First joint exercise
A modified version of the INEX 1 (OECD 1995) international emergency exercise
scenario was used in the first joint comparison exercise. This particular
scenario was chosen because new RUG members had not completed their
collection of national data at the time of the exercise. Also, the RODOS software
was distributed with a complete data set for this scenario (Steinhauer 1996A
and 1996B, Rojas-Palma, 1999). The exercise focused on early phase issues
and the calculation area was limited to the near-range, i.e. the computation
area covered 40 by 40 square kilometres (Ammann et al., 1999). Most
participants used the near-range atmospheric dispersion and deposition
module RODOS/QUICKPRO and the early countermeasure simulation module
RODOS/EMERSIM to assess the potential consequences and to perform 'what-if'
analysis.
The accident scenario, which included the timetable of events, was supplied to
the crisis team. The exercise stopped twelve hours after SCRAM. It was not
prescribed when or how the crisis team entered the scene, nor how the
emergency situation should be managed. It was proposed that all participating
teams should follow their own national procedures.
According to the scenario description the accident started with a fire in a
switchboard at midnight, leading to the shutdown of the reactor. At 04:00 in
the morning the utility informed authorities that in the worst case fuel
uncovering could happen in about 5 hours, i.e., 09:00. There was a significant
risk (about 50%) of a large release from the plant but again it was estimated
that the release would not occur before 09:00. The assessment provided was
conservative, i.e., the actual release, if it happened, would not be greater than
the given source term. Real-time weather data was available supposedly on-
line from site instrumentation. It was assumed that the most recently recorded
weather situation would prevail for the following hours.
Given this sparse information first 'what-if' consequence assessments were
made with the RODOS system. Some participants started with the identification
of the potentially threatened area and an assessment of whether protective
actions may have to be taken to prevent deterministic health effects. The
effective dose in normal living conditions, summed over all pathways for the
duration of the plume, was used to estimate the deterministic health effects
and the risks of large-scale stochastic effects. To assess the need for iodine
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prophylaxis some crisis teams requested either the thyroid dose for children in
normal living conditions or the estimated number of thyroid cancer occurring
in children. By applying dose criteria, potential intervention areas were
defined where measures like evacuation, sheltering and iodine prophylaxis
should be taken. RODOS provided this information in the form of thematic
maps, which together with other information (plant status, weather) were
used to make recommendations regarding countermeasures in specific areas.
Decision making on protective actions prior to a release is rather difficult. In
the threat phase or in the early release phase decisions on protective actions
have to be based on the plant status and cannot be based on dose predictions,
which depend on the progress of the accident in a NPP. 'What-if' analyses are
used to gain additional insight on potential consequences. In this exercise very
little information about the plant status was included.
An actual release was detected at 12:00. The estimated source term provided
for the release was lower than the earlier estimation. RODOS was rerun using
the updated source term assessment and weather information. Individual and
collective doses as well as designated areas for sheltering, distribution of
stable iodine for children and adults, respectively, were recalculated and used
to revise the previous recommendations on countermeasures.
Second joint exercise
A hypothetical exercise scenario was developed for the second joint comparison
exercise of the RUG. A nuclear accident was assumed to happen in a fictitious
NPP. This plant was sited in the respective countries of the players so that they
could exercise in their own national environment and base the calculations on
their own data. The PWR was assumed to have a large, dry steel containment
and its thermal power to be around 2000 MW(t), and to be of typical European
design. Modules for atmospheric dispersion and deposition calculations
(QUICKPRO), for early phase emergency simulations (EMERSIM), for calculating
the activity concentrations in the food-chain (FDMT) and for agricultural
countermeasures and decontamination (LCMT) were provided within RODOS.
Only those countermeasures that were expected to be most effective at
reducing the dose to the population were considered, e.g. iodine prophylaxis,
sheltering, evacuation, selected food countermeasures and agricultural
decontamination.  
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The exercise covered the first week of the accident, i.e. from the first
notification of the emergency to the time when fallout pattern and composition
were measured. The magnitude of the release was adjusted so that the area of
interest covered roughly 320 by 320 square kilometres.
The meteorological situation was given as a time-series of wind direction, wind
speed, diffusion category and rain intensity. The wind directions were listed in
degrees relative to a suitable direction and it was left to the players to rotate
the reference direction in such a way that the scenario produced a reasonable
and not a too complicated emergency situation in the respective countries.
The chosen time of the accident was during a working day at the end of June.
The accident started with a fire in one of the electrical cabinet rooms and
caused a successful shutdown of the reactor. The effects of the fire and an
independent failure of the emergency core cooling system prevented core
cooling. The containment was isolated. Core heat-up started 3.5 hours after
shutdown and one hour later the vessel breached at high pressure.
Containment sprays started and operated successfully.  It was not possible to
cool the debris in the cavity and its temperature reached 2500K seven hours
after the shutdown. At T0 + 12 hours, the temperature of the debris was
stabilised at 1600K. Due to the temperature of the core debris, large quantities
of hydrogen and carbon monoxide were generated. Combustion occurred at 43
hours after shutdown, resulting in containment failure and the release of
radionuclides to the environment.
The release scenario was based on a containment failure classification. There
are several possible containment event tree branches in each containment
failure group. These were assessed by nuclear safety experts and based on
their decisions the release fractions given in Table I were calculated. Using the
releases estimated for the stated fractiles of the cumulative distribution
functions1 the impact of each release could be assessed in terms of the scale of
countermeasures required and the probability of the release occurring.
                                                     
1 The cumulative distribution gives the probability that a release magnitude is less or equal
than the particular magnitude.
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Table I. Source term assessment of the hypothetical accident. The release
fractions of the 5%, 50% and 95% fractiles of the release distribution are given.
Nuclide group Release fraction
5%
fractile
50%
fractile
95%
fractile
Noble gases 8.0⋅10-1 8.5⋅10-1 9.3⋅10-1
Iodine total 8⋅10-4 1.3⋅10-2 7⋅10-2
Alkaline-group (Cs, Rb) 7⋅10-4 1⋅10-2 6⋅10-2
Tellurium-group (Te, Se, Sb) 1⋅10-10 1⋅10-4 2⋅10-2
Alkaline earth-group (Sr, Ba) <⋅10-10 <⋅10-10 1.5⋅10-6
Ruthenium-group (Ru, Mo, Tc) <⋅10-10 <⋅10-10 5⋅10-8
Lanthanide-group La, Nb, Zr, Cm, Ce,
Nd, Pm, Sm, Eu, Pu, refr. Ox. Nb, Zr)
<⋅10-10 <⋅10-10 7⋅10-8
The release began 43 hours after shutdown, at 08:00, and lasted for 12 hours.
The release rate was not constant, and it was assumed that the initial rate of
release diminished roughly exponentially within 12 hours. The effective
release height was 100 m, which corresponded roughly to an initial heat
release rate of a few megawatts (the actual release height was 60 m).
Immediately following the release the source term was reassessed using plant
status information, plant instrumentation and field measurements. The source
term was estimated to correspond to the 5% fractile given in Table I.
Conclusions of the exercises
A number of RUG members participated in the exercises and each team
prepared a short summary of their performance in each exercise. The main
findings were reviewed and discussed during the meetings of the RUG and are
presented below.
Regarding the first exercise, it was remarked that the scenario description was
too vague in several aspects, e.g. neither the plant status nor the time
behaviour of the release was known. There was no information on the
resources needed and available for implementing countermeasures. There was
no data on schools, hospitals, factories, etc. The second exercise overcame some
of these shortcomings by locating the accident in each player’s own country.
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Thus national geographic and demographic information was available. But the
scenario of the second exercise not only added more realism, it also provided
the opportunity to carry out more extensive calculations.
The operation of RODOS takes considerable training. Since not all participants
had sufficient training, features and tools within RODOS remained
undiscovered. This deficiency was sometimes attributed to the design of the
RODOS software.
For some participating organisations, both the decision-makers and their
advisors (RODOS users) and RODOS operators were all in the same room during
the exercise. This would not correspond to usual practice. It was noticed that
the occasional observer or end-users of results got lost in the number of
windows that appeared before the required information was available. It is
recommended therefore that the end-users only receive concise outputs that
are sufficiently annotated. They should not be directly confronted or concerned
with the operation of RODOS.
If decision-makers are presented with all the information that can be produced
with the RODOS system, there is danger that they will base decisions
selectively on information they grasped, or anchor to the first or most recent
information given. Therefore, there were attempts to define a default
information set that would be provided to the stakeholders. This set would
contain the necessary up-to-date supportive data in a concise but clear format
to facilitate their decision-making. More detailed information would be
supplied only upon an explicit request. The following information was
considered as ‘default information’ in the joint case studies.
Thematic maps:
• plume arrival time;
• effective dose in normal living conditions;
• thyroid dose in children/adults from inhalation of radioiodine in normal
living conditions;
• effective dose from ground, integrated over a relatively short time;
• effective dose from cloud during plume passage;
• time integrated activity concentration of I-131in air;
• ground deposition of Cs-137;
• nuclide specific concentrations in food- and feed staffs;
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• population distribution;
• proposed intervention areas for sheltering, evacuation, iodine tablets, food
ban areas etc.
Tables containing:
• collective doses in the proposed countermeasure areas when actions are
taken and when not, i.e. estimation of the avertable doses;
• monetary cost of the actions;
• number of people affected by the actions.
Time plots:
• nuclide specific deposited activity;
• nuclide specific activity concentration in feed and foodstuffs.
3.3 RODOS and other DSS in participating countries
RODOS is installed in most of the RUG member organisation. Past activities and
the current status of the installations and their adaptations to national needs
is described in this section. Comments are also made on the use of RODOS in
exercises, training and planning.
Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finland
General
STUK has been actively involved in the RODOS project since 1996 and since then
different prototype releases of the RODOS software have been installed on a HP
Workstation (Model 715), modified for Finnish conditions and tested at the
Research and Environmental Surveillance Department. The last RODOS
version that was developed and released during the EU's 4th Framework
Programme (1994-1998), i.e. RODOS PV 4.0 F, was reported to be stable and fit
for use by the end users. Although it was still termed pre-operational and the
development was ongoing, STUK decided to install it in its emergency centre.
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Current status
In September 2000 STUK purchased a new HP Workstation (HP Visualize 3600)
to operate the RODOS software in its emergency centre. The RODOS version PV
4.0 F, released on 7 Dec 2000, was installed on that workstation on 3 January
2001. The system was tested and configured during January 2001 and
deployed in the emergency centre. From 1 February 2001 RODOS has been in
continuous operation. Being a pre-operational version, the system performance
was and continues to be tested and evaluated.
The RODOS modules installed have been adapted to varying degrees to Finnish
conditions. Vector maps and population data on a grid that covers the whole of
Finland were installed. Plant and inventory parameters for the Finnish NPPs
at Loviisa and Olkiluoto were inserted into the database. Available data for
the NPPs in neighbouring countries (Forsmark, Oskarshamn, Barsebeck,
Ringhals, Sosnovi Bor, Kola, Ignalina) was also included. The
parameterisation of the milk pathway has been modified to local conditions,
but work is still needed to further revise the parameterisation of FDMT and
LCMT to the radio-ecological conditions in Finland. Agricultural production
data has, as yet, to be provided in the appropriate format for inputting into
RODOS. Real-time weather mast data from the two Finnish NPP sites are
received on a regular basis, but data entry routines have to be written. The
provision of HIRLAM data from the Finnish Meteorological Service is not yet
agreed but it is hoped that an agreement can be reached during 2001. An
optional interface to the approved Finnish long-range atmospheric transport
model is being investigated.
Two operators received training in the use of RODOS (one participated in the
training course for operators organised by FZK in Nov 2000). Personnel
involved in emergency management, i.e. experts in radiation protection,
environmental surveillance, health physics, etc., were introduced to RODOS and
instructed in its use. Procedures for the operation of RODOS in the emergency
centre were drafted and will be adjusted as experience is gained during the
present and coming year.
Use
During the last few years STUK has used and tested RODOS on different
occasions. The most recent occasion (September 2000) was its participation in
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the second joint exercise of the RUG. Later phase issues were the main concern
of this exercise and the RODOS modules QUICKPRO, EMERSIM, FDMT and LCMT
were used and evaluated. A year earlier (August 1999) STUK participated in
the first joint exercise of the RUG, which dealt with early phase issues and
QUICKPRO and EMERSIM were the RODOS modules tested.
RODOS was also used to provide crucial input and support for the different
workshops on analytical decision making that STUK arranged in co-operation
with the System Analysis Laboratory of the Helsinki University of Technology
(Hämäläinen et al. 1998 and 2000). The first series of workshops were held in
1997 and these workshops dealt with countermeasure planning and decision-
making in the early phase of a nuclear accident. One of the accident scenarios
studied was re-examined in the following year, when early phase decision-
making issues were examined using an interview technique. In May 2000 a
facilitated workshop on decision making was held which embraced the early
and late phases of the accident. In the preparation of and during these
conferences it was STUK's responsibility to analyse the radiological situations
and to assess the need for countermeasures. RODOS was the main tool that
supported this work.
Since it's installation at STUK, RODOS has also been used routinely in parallel
with the existing tools during emergency exercises. For these exercises an X
Window emulation program was installed on a Windows NT workstation at
the emergency centre and used to accessed RODOS remotely via the Intranet.
Normally these exercises stopped at the threat phase. However a recent
(September 2000) exercise dealt explicitly with later phase issues and
RODOS/FDMT was successfully used. In another later phase exercise, held
earlier in spring 2000, RODOS was used to describe the radiological
consequences of the accident and to simulate measurement data during the
exercise.
In January 2000 RODOS was used to carry out an interim investigation into the
potential threat that exists for the Finnish population from a worst case
accident scenario at the neighbouring nuclear installations.
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Nuclear Protection and Safety Institute (IPSN), France
General
IPSN was involved in the RODOS project since 1996. During the EU's 4th
Framework Programme it developed, in collaboration with STUK, a model for
forest ecosystems. In 1996, two HP workstations were purchased and installed
at Fontenay-aux-Roses and Cadarache. The RODOS version 3.11 was installed
on both. At the beginning of 2000, IPSN installed the RODOS version 3.17 and
performed, in June 2000, a French-German exercise at the border of the two
countries and Switzerland.
Current status
At Cadarache the RODOS system was used to develop the forest module and not
as a tool for emergency management. This is the reason why IPSN did not
participate in the first joint exercise. The RODOS software has not been adapted
to French conditions. Difficulties in operating the system during the second
exercise prevented us from providing results. In 2001, two operators will be
trained at FZK.
Karlsruhe Research Center (FZK), Germany
General
In its role as the main developer of the RODOS system, the FZK contributions to
the RUG activities of the RODOS team have concentrated on
• informing the members on the project planning and the status and
functions of the different RODOS versions;
• giving advice on the hardware and software components of the RODOS
system and its networking during the installation at the members’
institute;
• distributing the RODOS versions PV3.1, PV3.13 and PV4.0 to the RUG
members and supporting their installation and operation by telephone or
E-mail contacts;
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• providing technical advice and data during the preparatory phase of the
two emergency exercises;
• answering questions and problems emerging during the use of the system,
in particular when preparing and performing emergency exercises;
• receiving, evaluating and responding to suggestions for further
improvement of the system or modifications of its functionality.
Activities
In both, the first and the second exercise, the RODOS Team at FZK played the
role of an observer and evaluator giving support in interpreting the results
and any inconsistencies observed by the various institutes. In addition, FZK
participated at the first emergency exercise.
For the first exercise, it was assumed that the site was located at FZK. To play
the scenario as a realistic table top exercise would have required an operator
for the RODOS system, a radiation protection counsellor for defining the tasks
to the operator and demanding the results needed from RODOS for the
emergency management team. Personnel for the first two tasks was available,
but FZK as a research institution has no direct access to the management staff
of the Federal States of the Federal Government. Within the given time scale
of the exercise, it was not possible to organise a corresponding decision making
conference.
Therefore it was decided to concentrate on assessments, using RODOS, of the
potential early emergency actions for the two accident situations provided in
the scenario description, and only marginally touch the problem of decision
making. The work performed in connection with participation at the first
exercise and the results achieved are documented in Ammann et al., (1999).
NCSR "Demokritos", Greece
General
The Environmental Research Laboratory (EREL) of NCSR “Demokritos” has
participated in the RODOS Project as a Contractor since 1993, and has been
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developing modules for the mesoscale meteorology and atmospheric dispersion
of pollutants over highly irregular terrain. EREL has been a Contractor of the
RUG since September 1998. The goal of the EREL in the framework of RUG is to
examine RODOS from the operational point of view and establish
communication links with other RODOS users in order to exchange information.
The long term aim is the incorporation of RODOS in the Greek national
emergency system.
The nuclear emergency management system is a responsibility of the Greek
Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC), which has the task to predict and evaluate
the effects of the radiological events in Greece. Since no nuclear power plant
exists in Greece the main concern is to assess the effects in the Greek territory
from nuclear accidents that may happen in other countries.  EREL provides
support for the GAEC to accomplish this task, by operating RODOS which is a
consistent and complete system for evaluating the effects of nuclear accidents.
Current status
RODOS is presently installed and operated in the EREL. All the previous RODOS
versions (2.∗, 3.∗) were installed on an HP 735 workstation, while the latest
PRTY 4.0 and PV 4.0 F have been installed on an HP K260 server.
In view of the special Greek requirements, the following matters have been
identified as necessary to be solved for an operational function of the RODOS
system:
• computing environment
• databases with data on NPPs in Europe, accident scenarios and source
terms, topography, land cover, meteorology, population, food production,
radiological data
• communications - networks
Some of the above requirements (such as the list of the NPPs in Europe, and
the accident scenarios and source terms) have already been covered in the
latest RODOS versions or are planned to be included in the future versions. For
the rest of the items, actions have been undertaken by EREL during the period
of the RUG project. More specifically, with the aid of a Geographical
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Information System, the construction of databases for topography and land
cover for all Europe has started and is still continuing. Concerning the
meteorological data, after some discussions with the Greek National
Meteorological Service, the latter is providing on a daily basis Numerical
Weather Prediction data that cover most of the European continent, with 6
hours prediction steps and 3 days forecast length. These data can be used for
calculations of long-range atmospheric dispersion. Planned work for the future
includes the completion of the databases with population and food production
data and the connection of RODOS with the network of monitoring stations
operating on the Greek territory.
Use
EREL has participated in the 2nd benchmark exercise organised by RUG. The
basic aim in performing this exercise was to examine the operation of RODOS
from the point of view of a user, for a nuclear emergency situation and under
the specific conditions that apply in Greece. Specific targets were to use the
whole model chain of RODOS as far as possible, identify the output that is
useful for Greece, communicate eventual difficulties and problems to the users
and developers communities, and identify the missing items for customising
RODOS for operational use in the country.
Since no nuclear power plant exists in Greece, the Kosloduj NPP was selected,
which is the closest to the Greek borders. This distance (275 km) posed a
problem in applying the model chain QUICKPRO- EMERSIM-FDMT and LCMT, as
agreed in the specifications of the exercise, since QUICKPRO is valid for
atmospheric dispersion from local to meso-scale. However it was decided to
neglect this inconsistency and perform the exercise to test the operation of
RODOS, without referring to the physical significance of the produced results.
After the insertion of the accident site and source term in RODOS, the
calculations grid was defined to cover the distance up to Athens. The suitable
wind direction was selected, to direct the plume towards Greece. The
atmospheric dispersion calculations were successfully performed but problems
have been encountered in operating the countermeasures and food chain
models.  Problems were also encountered in the graphical presentations of the
results.
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The experiences acquired from the performance of the benchmark exercise
have been communicated to the systems developers during the last RUG
meeting. Other conclusions drawn from the exercise concerned mainly the
necessity of completing the underlying databases of the system, as are the
NPPs in Europe, geographical, food production and radio-ecological data.
Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland (RPII), Ireland
General
Under the National Emergency Plan for nuclear accidents, the Radiological
Protection Institute of Ireland has responsibility for carrying out a technical
assessment of the potential or actual consequences of any nuclear accident and
for recommending what measures should be taken to minimise the radiation
exposure of members of the public. In 1998 it was agreed that a decision
support system (DSS) would be of great assistance towards carrying out this
responsibility and steps should be taken to obtain and install an appropriate
system at the Institute.
At this time the RUG was being established and as a potential user of the
system, we were accepted for membership of this group. Membership of the
group would provide an introduction to other users and assist us in gaining a
good appreciation of both the administrative and technical support
requirements required to operate such a system.
Activities
To obtain a good understanding of the requirements for the operational a
reliable RODOS system, we met with the RODOS operational and development
teams at FZK, Karlsruhe. Following this meeting doubts as to the capability of
our Institute to operate and maintain such a complex system were raised. The
Institute have a small staff and could not dedicate sufficient staff numbers to
be assured that RODOS would be maintained and operated successfully. These
fears were re-enforced through RUG meetings and the apparent difficulties
that larger organisations were having with the operation of RODOS.
While not rejecting RODOS, it was decided that other PC operated systems
should be investigated. We obtained a copy of the Danish decision support
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system, ARGOS NT, for a trial period. This system is much simpler than that of
RODOS and more manageable within our staffing constraints. It was therefore
decided to make a commitment to ARGOS NT rather than to RODOS. As links
existed between the RODOS and ARGOS NT communities, and future
developments and extensions to ARGOS NT would incorporate programmes used
in RODOS, we remained members of RUG. We could therefore continue to
contribute to the discussions on the needs of users of such systems, and their
use in emergency planning.
We are currently finalising contractual terms for the use of ARGOS NT and
arranging for the transfer of HIRLAM data to the Institute from the national
meteorological service. ARGOS NT will be commissioned and operated by staff at
our Institute.
In the absence of a fully functional DSS, our participation in the RUG exercise
was somewhat limited. However our participation has been very useful and
highlighted areas that need to be addressed in regard to how such DSSs would
be used in an emergency. These would include the best format for presenting
data to the decision makers and how much detail should they be given,
especially in the case where a choice of options based on the probabilities of
different release scenarios exist.
We will continue to keep in touch with the DSS community through attendance
at relevant DSSNET meetings that are open to non-members of the concerted
action group.
RIVM, the Netherlands
General
The Laboratory of Radiation Research (LSO) of the RIVM was the Dutch
representative in the RUG. The national emergency information centre for
nuclear accidents (IDC) as well as the management for the National Monitoring
network for Radioactivity (NMR) are located at the institute. This centre
supports the policy making process with information on all kinds of
radiological measurements and model results and reports directly to a
governmental management team.
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The emergency management system that is currently in place at the IDC is
some nine years old and is presently being upgraded. In this framework RIVM
was and is interested in the possibilities of the RODOS system. Because of this
we were first of all interested in installing the RODOS system at our institute
for evaluation and testing. Implementation, as the Dutch nuclear emergency
management system, may afterwards be considered. The RUG was and
continues to be seen as a platform where not only information on problems but
also on software developments can be exchanged. It was a growing source of
“user knowledge”.
Activities
As a member of the RUG concerted action at least one representative of RIVM
participated in several of the RUG meetings. These meetings were important
from the view of collecting information on RODOS and meeting people from
other countries and institutes involved in the RODOS system.
Two courses on RODOS (early effects and countermeasures and late effects and
countermeasures) were attended at FZK in November 1997 and April 1999.
In April 1998 we assisted NRG (Petten, the Netherlands) in organizing a
Decision Conference in the Netherlands using the RODOS system for the
intermediate phase, i.e. the phase where the cloud has passed by and where
measurement results are just starting to come in. This meeting took place in
The Hague, 27-28 May 1998, at the Ministry of the Environment. In
preparation we visited FZK from 23-24 April 1998. The results of the
Conference were reported by NRG (van Hienen et al., 1998).
Current status and future plans
Although we just recently joined the RODOS community we already have a
series of installations behind us: March 2000 we received version 3.13, but that
happened to be a 64-bit version (or 2.0 architecture) which at that time could
not be installed on our machines. In the months that followed we received new
hardware and were able to install the 64-bit version of RODOS that had evolved
into version 3.16 by June 2000. In September 2000 version 4.0 was
downloaded from the FZK site. Although we didn’t yet fully take advantage of
the earlier version, this new version was to be used in the last exercise of the
RUG. Unfortunately this version had several unexplained crashes. As a result
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we are now, January 2001, at the brink of installing 4.0F, the ‘final’ version,
and a hopefully more stable software version.
During the installation process and during the testing period we expected to
gather a better understanding of the data sets and specific applications needed
for a more permanent installation or even implementation in an operational
emergency management system. However, because of the number of
installations up till now, we have not yet succeeded in reaching this goal. This
was mainly due to the fact that RODOS was too long ‘under development’.
Hopefully this problem will be resolved in the near future, during the DSSNET
programme.
Although the RUG now has come to an end, we will not abandon the RODOS
system. We are now involved in DSSNET, the successor to the RUG.
Furthermore, most of the data needed for an installation of RODOS are
available at the RIVM. This refers to most of the geographical information on
the Netherlands that is needed (topographical maps, population data, data on
NPP’s, source terms, land use etc.). It might be that specific updates will be
needed (for instance land use). Meteorological data has also to be converted to
the specific needs of RODOS or its components. Because we use HIRLAM for our
present long-range transport code, this should not be too big a problem. We
therefore will proceed with the installation.
Our first concern now is to adapt the system to our needs, i.e.:
• connection to other databases (e.g. GIS data, laboratory data, meteorology
data);
• producing data sets (resolution needed, possibilities of exporting RODOS
data to GIS);
• management of data sets (update frequency, validation);
• possibilities of coupling with other systems (measurement networks, our
own dispersion models, other computer systems, communication with and
presentation at other locations other then that of the RODOS system e.g.
through web pages).
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National Atomic Energy Agency, Poland
General
IEA has been engaged in the RODOS project since 1994 through the PECO and
INCO-Copernicus programmes under 3rd, 4th and 5th Framework Programmes of
the European Union. In addition, the implementation of the RODOS system
within the national emergency preparedness arrangements in Poland and the
Slovak Republic has been progressed through a one year project (ECHO) set up
for this purpose. RODOS version 3.13 has been installed and implemented in
the Centre for Radiological Events (CEZAR) of the National Atomic Energy
Agency (NAEA). IAE is responsible for providing the technical support to CEZAR
and also for the customisation of the system to national conditions.
Current status
The RODOS v. 3.13 system is used as a non-official tool at CEZAR and is operated
on a cluster of 2 servers (HP R/390). The readily available software “Service
Guard” from HP was installed to provide continuous operation of the system in
the event of a failure of one of the servers. The communication lines
between CEZAR and the Institute of Meteorology and Water Management (the
national weather data provider), the Central Laboratory for Radiological
Protection (responsible for radiological monitoring network based on PMS part
of the ARGOS NT system) and the Institute of Atomic Energy (the location of the
only Polish nuclear installations, in particular the research reactor MARIA)
were established.
In the process of customisation of the RODOS system a particular emphases
was put on the following activities:
• preparing numerical maps of different scales (from 1:10,000 for the area
around IAE and up to 1:1,000,000 for the whole territory of Poland);
• collecting data for radio-ecological regions mainly for use in FDMT and
LCMT modules;
• setting the parameters in the radio-ecological models for Polish conditions.
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The process of customisation of the system to national conditions is not easy
and demands great efforts. It has been recently decided by FZK to prepare a
special document on all procedures relating to this problem.
The RODOS system was successfully tested in accordance with the test
procedures developed by FZK. The system was also verified in operational
mode i.e. with on-line real-time data delivered to the system. Because of the
lack of some data, a special procedure was prepared to produce artificial data
to simulate the real conditions.
RODOS operating procedures for use in emergency and normal situations were
written for specific staff members of the CEZAR. Training courses based on
material obtained from FZK and STUK were developed and organised for the
operators and other users of the system.
The same version (3.13) has also been installed and implemented in IAE and
can be used locally in the Swierk Centre.
The RODOS 4.0 beta version has been installed in IAE and the final 4.0 F
version is being implemented at present. After implementation, this version
will be also installed in CEZAR. The main problem in implementing the
operation of the system is the lack of technical documentation describing how
on-line, real-time data should be delivered to the system. According to FZK,
such a document will be available soon, so it can be expected that at the end of
the first quarter of 2001 the process of full implementation of RODOS v. 4.0 F in
emergency centre should be completed.
Use
The RODOS 3.13 system was carefully tested and verified in real conditions i.e.
with on-line connection to measurement data. As there is no nuclear plant in
Poland the main area of interest lies in long range calculations, which will be
available after the installation of RODOS version 4.0 F. The current system can
be usefully employed for nuclear facilities, in particular the research reactor
MARIA. A special exercise based on a simulated accident at the MARIA reactor
has been developed. The aim of this exercise is to test RODOS capabilities in
real conditions. The exercise is planned to take place in the near future.
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On completion of the ECHO project the RODOS system was presented to local
authorities. In this presentation all the important features of the system were
shown using a simulated emergency situation at a fictitious nuclear plant
located somewhere in Poland.
IAE and CEZAR participated also in the exercises developed by STUK as a part of
RUG activities.  As a result of the training courses organised within the ECHO
project, the staff of CEZAR had only minor problems with the operation of the
system. The system produced a lot of useful information. However there is still
a need for decision-makers to be trained on the effective use of the data
provided by the system, particularly in relation to mid- and long-term
countermeasures. In these cases, many different possible countermeasures
exist and it’s not easy to select the optimal strategy. The other point is that up
to now a comprehensive tool such as RODOS has not been available for the staff
of the emergency centre. This means that appropriate training will play a key
role in the future use of the system.
It would be also of great importance to organise exercises with on-line and
real-time data supplied to the system. This unique feature of the RODOS
system should be carefully verified and tested in a real situation. Up to now
because of the lack of full technical description of the system it hasn’t been
possible to test all capabilities of the system.
Direccao Geral do Ambiente (DGA), Portugal
General
DGA is formally associated to the RODOS project since 1995 when an agreement
was signed with the European Commission for the use of the software and the
system. In October 1998 DGA joined RUG. In 1999 DGA and several European
partners put forward a project (DSSNET) proposal to the EU 5th framework
programme. This proposal was approved on October of 2000.
Current status
The RODOS PRTY 4.0 F version is now installed, and reconfiguration for the
national environment is being performed. Several actions have been taken to
configure the network, mainly firewall configuration and internal architecture.
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It is now possible for FZK to remotely access the DGA machine. Due to the
increasing requirements of the RODOS system on both hardware and software,
the acquisition of a new machine is necessary.
The management of the national meteorological network is the responsibility
of the Meteorology Institute (IM), which is also responsible for the analysis and
forecast of the meteorological conditions in the Portuguese territories. Several
products are now being supplied to DGA by the IM:
• wind direction and magnitude at sea level and at 850 hPa, with a 6 hours
time sampling for a period of 72 hours and the accumulated precipitation
every 12 hours for a period of 72 hours, for a 1  coverage of the area
between 30  N and 40  N and between 20  W and 4  E;
• parameters indicating the height of the boundary layer, and an indicator of
the stability, but only over an area between 35  N and 45  N of latitude and
10  W and 0  W of longitude with a spatial step of 0.5 degrees;
• real time data acquired from meteorological stations are available at 13
locations in the Portuguese territories, with a sampling time of 3 hours,
consisting of magnitude and wind direction at the surface, air and dew
point temperature and 1-hour accumulated precipitation. These stations
are placed at the same locations of the automatic environmental
radiological survey network (RADNET).
The 13 stations of the RADNET record continuously data on external gamma
radiation (with an integration period of 1 minute). Integration of the
radiological data with meteorological data has been completed.
The integration of on-line meteorological and radiological data with RODOS will
be attempted in 2001. Customisation of the local network for the exchange of
data between the RODOS system and the central units has been completed.
To customise RODOS to the Portuguese needs, geographical information has
been compiled.
All the digitised maps at DGA are in SHAPE format. From these only the
following were found relevant to this phase of the project: basin and runoff
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information, lakes and dams, major river maps, maps of major roads, railway
network and location of the major urban centres.
Information on population density, urban occupation, full road network, land
use and crops distribution are being processed at DGA.
Use
On January 1998, within the framework of the Portuguese-Spanish
Agreement regarding the Safety of Border Nuclear Facilities between CSN
(Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear) and DGA, an exercise involving a simulated
accident in a nuclear ship off the north coast of Portugal took place.
Consideration was only given to the early phase of the accident, and real
meteorological conditions were used. The consequences of the accident were
assessed by DGA using the RODOS system (version PTRY 3.0). Input
meteorological files were constructed using the real forecast data provided by
IM (Meteorological Institute) and the functionality of the pre-processing data
programs was tested.
In July 1999 the first RUG exercise took place and simulated an accident at a
NPP in a fictitious country. The assessment focused on the early phase of the
accident and the near site consequences.
In November 2000 the second RUG exercise was undertaken. It simulated a
severe accident at a NPP placed on national territory and the emphasis was
primarily on late phase consequences.
The RODOS system was also applied in the development of a national response
plan in case of a nuclear submarine accident at Lisbon harbour.
In all these exercises, but mainly following the RUG comparison exercises, the
conclusions were relayed to the developers and several improvements to the
system followed.
Future plans
• the updating of the system with the new revised versions delivered by the
development team;
• completion of the customisation of the system with local specific data;
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• training on the operation of the RODOS interface during emergency
exercises;
• use of the system in the training of experts from the institutions
potentially involved on decision making and/or decision advising in case of
nuclear emergencies in Portugal;
• maintaining communication with other system users in order to solve
arising problems;
• customisation and configuration of the automatic mode of the RODOS
system.
"Horia Hulubei" National Institute of Physics and Nuclear
Engineering, Romania
Activities
The main activities of our RODOS related research programs in the period
October 1999 to November 2000 have been:
• to evaluate the consequences and the associated risk of tritium emission at
the Cernavoda CANDU-NPP in both normal operation and nuclear
emergencies/accidents;
• to model tritium deposition from the atmosphere onto the soil, its
transport into deeper soil layers and the resulting depth distribution;  also
tritium re-emission from the soil to the atmosphere;
• to develop a dose assessment model with the objective of routinely
controlling, without underestimating the dose, the emission of tritiated
water into the atmosphere;
• to create an FDMH database for the southern area of Romania and to test
the sub-modules of FDMH together with the improved modelling of the
tritium transfer in animal products (from feeds, breathing and water);
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• to develop and install software for a set of models that address the
radioactive contamination both of surface (swallow) waters and
underground waters;
• to provide additional/supplementary on-line and real-time data from met-
towers and radiological data from the Cernavoda CANDU-NPP;
• to co-operate with NRG-KEMA group (The Netherlands) regarding
installation of RODOS PRTY 3.13 on their computer, the testing of the latest
version (February 2000) of HYDRO-RODOS and LAKEKO-A & LAKEKO-B model
validation for Northern Europe lakes;
• to adapt RODSO PRTY 3.13 (received at the end of 1999) to Romanian
conditions and fully integrate the FDMH module.
Current status
The installation of RODOS PV 4.0 (beta) in Romania is aimed at following
objectives:
• to test the compatibility of the Romanian geographic and radio-ecological
databases with the new RODOS prototype version. The scenario from RUG’s
second joint exercise was used for this purpose;
• to check that all code contained in RODOS PV 4.0 is compatible with our
already five years old HP 9000/735 workstation;
• to verify that FDMH operates correctly with the Romanian database;
• to revise the CANDU source term files, following the requirements of the
new RODOS version, in order to account for 7 instead of 3 radionuclide
groups;
• to clarify how tritium will be used in RODOS version and how it will be
inserted in the CANDU source term database.
The RODOS system currently runs properly when used in the interactive mode
option for early phase prognosis. But we encountered problems in using FDMT
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and LCMT and it cannot be operated in real-time based on our on-line
meteorological data.
The Romanian RODOS team has presented the hardware and software
requirements for a RODOS system installation in a Nuclear Emergency Center
to the state authorities. At the same time, IFIN-HH advised the Central
Commission for Nuclear Accident and Falling of Extra-Atmospheric Objects
(CCANCOC) to include in its general annual plan of activities the installation of
the RODOS system in the Emergency Centre. This should include the training
of the personnel in the use of the RODOS system, with the assistance of our
institute specialists.
VUJE Trnava Inc. –  Engineering, Design and Research
Organisation, The Slovak Republic
General
VUJE Trnava Inc. has been largely involved in development and
implementation of comprehensive decision support system RODOS under the
RODOS R&D and Thematic Network projects within the 3rd, 4th and 5th
Framework Programmes. With support from the European Commission’s
ECHO programme RODOS PV 3.13 was implemented in the Slovak Republic. The
RODOS system was installed for use within the emergency arrangements in a
“pre-operational” capacity.
Current status
All pre-conditions from computer hardware and communication links to
procedures for normal and emergency operation and training of operators and
users for the operation of the national RODOS centre were established in one
year during the period of 1999-2000. Within the project, RODOS was adapted to
country specific conditions.
Institutions and their role within the projects for RODOS implementation in the
Slovak Republic are as follows:
• Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic (NRA SR): National
RODOS Centre;
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• Slovak Centre for Radiation Monitoring (SCRM): radiation monitoring and
measuring systems; passive user, data supplier;
• VUJE Trnava Inc.: Technical Support Organisation; interactive user;
• Slovak Hydro-Meteorological Institute (SHMI): real-time meteorological
monitoring data, providing access to the national radiation monitoring
network (NRIS) and to WMO; passive user, data supplier;
• NPP EBO Jaslovske Bohunice: plant radiation monitoring system, source
term data; passive user, data supplier;
• NPP EMO Mochovce: plant radiation monitoring system, source term data;
passive user, data supplier.
The equipment is based on a cluster of 2 servers  (HP type R 390) installed at
the Emergency Response Centre (ERC) of NRA SR. The communication links
necessary for the functions of RODOS in Slovakia are established. Passive users
and data providers are SCRM and SHMI in Bratislava, as well as two NPP sites
(Bohunice and Mochovce). VUJE is an interactive user.
The RODOS installation was adapted to country specific local conditions. This
work included mapping data of land use, build-up areas, traffic networks,
borderlines of regions and other geographical data; statistical data on grids
such as population distribution, radioecological region number, agricultural
production data, soil type, elevation data, hydrological data; data for
radioecological regions; site and plant characteristics for the Slovak NPPs;
emergency management data for early emergency actions and
intermediate/late countermeasures. Real-time on-line radiological and
meteorological data interfaces are under development.
The testing of the RODOS installation on all remote locations, as well as testing
of integral operation of RODOS system with all remote users using
communication links were performed according to the test procedures
developed by FZK.
The development of the operational procedures for the national RODOS centre
was performed by VUJE. The procedures cover all operational phases and all
interfaces. The procedures were written for different tasks identified as
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necessary for operating the RODOS centre. The task related approach in the
Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Republic fits better in existing
emergency preparedness arrangements. Operational procedures were
additionally tested in “real“ situation during training courses.
The training was developed and performed by VUJE for operators and users of
the RODOS system. Lessons learned were summarised, described in more
details with each individual task and presented to the RUG participants during
the Rhodes, Brussels and Prague Meetings.
RODOS PRTY 4.0 was installed in VUJE and adapted to local conditions. At
present, RODOS PV 4.0F is being implemented.
Use
The RUG members from the Slovak Republic, namely VUJE and NRA SR
participated in the second joint exercise of the RUG. RODOS PRTY 4.0 adapted to
the Slovak conditions was used for the simulation of a severe accident in
Bohunice V-2 NPP.
Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, Slovenia
In June 2000 a meeting was held between the Slovenian Nuclear Safety
Administration, potential beneficiary, Hydrometeorological Institute, data
provider, and Jozef Stefan Institute, potential subcontractor, to present to
them the characteristics of the RODOS system and highlights of the terms of
reference (TOR) for the RODOS contract. In November and December 2000 the
general TORs proposal was customised for Slovenia (i.e. determination of users,
layout of the communication network was proposed, equipment needs were
specified, and a list of potential subcontractors was proposed). In December
2000 two participants from Slovenia were sent to RODOS Operators Course to
FZK, Karlsruhe. On 13 December 2000, FZK, and EU, visited Slovenia and gave
a presentation on the RODOS system to all potential users in Slovenia:
Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration, Hydrometeorological Institute, Civil
Protection Administration and the Krško NPP, the representatives of Jozef
Stefan Institute and Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food also attended
the presentation. On the occasion of this visit the parameters for RODOS TOR
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were discussed with the representatives of the Slovenian Nuclear Safety
Administration, FZK and EU.
Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN), Spain
General
The Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) is the Spanish nuclear and
radiological safety authority. Apart from those functions related to the
licensing and controlling the nuclear and radioactive facilities, CSN has
assigned some important responsibilities and functions in emergency planning
and preparedness and during emergency situations. The main functions of CSN
in emergency situations are as follows:
• CSN participates in the formulation and approval of nuclear and
radiological emergency plans;
• CSN provides technical support to the authorities in the event of a nuclear
or radiation emergency. This technical support relates to nuclear safety
and radiation protection matters. CSN has to make a diagnosis and
prognosis of the operational status of the affected facility and of the off-site
radiological consequences. It formally proposes countermeasures intended
to protect the public;
• CSN surveys and monitors environmental radiation levels both around the
facilities and the countrywide, in normal and in emergency situations;
• CSN monitors the radiation doses that workers and the members of the
public may receive;
• CSN is, in general, responsible for the execution of actions and
interventions related to its specific missions (nuclear safety and
radiological protection) and is supported by other national bodies  (Ciemat,
Enresa, and National Institute of Meteorology).
CSN has an Emergency Centre, called SALEM, which is staffed continuously by
specialised engineers. This centre constantly receives information in electronic
STUK-A183
40
formats on nuclear power plant operations and on environmental radioactivity
parameters. This on-line information includes the following data:
• safety parameters of each nuclear reactor in the country. SALEM has
duplicated connections to the process computer of each reactor;
• real time local meteorological data. SALEM is connected to the NPP’s
meteorological towers;
• national meteorological data and forecast from the National Meteorological
Service (Instituto Nacional de Meteorología, INM). SALEM has a connection
to the INM process and forecast computer. Spanish Meteorological Service
receives HIRLAM data;
SALEM centre has direct access to the main on-line radiological networks of
Spain. The CSN monitoring network, called REVIRA, has its control centre in the
SALEM. This centre has also access to the monitoring networks of some
regional governments. The REVIRA control centre is connected to more than 40
stations, where gamma dose rate and the air concentrations (alpha, beta, Rn
and I-131) are monitored. Additionally, the Salem is connected to the Spanish
Radioactivity Alert Network comprising of more than 900 gamma dose rate
monitoring stations nation-wide.
That on-line information is complemented by the direct information received
from the NPP operators. SALEM has redundant communication systems to
connect to the facilities, authorities and other emergency operation centres.
Finally, SALEM is provided with complex calculation systems to process all the
information coming to the centre. These help to determine the status and
evolution of the events at the NPP, the atmospheric dispersion and the
radiological consequences of a radioactive release.
CSN decided to use RODOS in the SALEM centre as an additional tool to support
its functions in emergency situations.
Current status and future plans
In October 1998 CSN signed a formal agreement with FZK, the representative of
the RODOS Consortium, on the use of the RODOS system. In April 1999 CSN
joined the RUG Concerted Action. Currently, CSN is participating in the DSSNET
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project of the Commission with other RODOS users as partners. The formal
agreement on DSSNET was signed by CSN in November 2000.
In February 1999 CSN installed a pre-operational version of RODOS on a new
server (HP server, PA-8200, 256 MB RAM memory, 18 GB disk memory) at its
computer centre. At SALEM two X-terminals were installed which allowed a
connection to the RODOS system. The system was updated whenever a new
version of RODOS was released. Currently RODOS PRTY 4.0 is installed. We plan
to install the RODOS version PV 4.0 F in the coming weeks.
The current RODOS system available at CSN is not yet customised to Spanish
conditions (national model for emergency management and local and national
databases). Some other priorities have precluded the required development of
these subjects. Recently CSN has determined a project to internally co-ordinate
the development of the CSN RODOS system. This project includes the
participation of experts of various CSN departments: Radiological Protection,
Emergency Planning and Computers. We intent to determine a two years plan
in order to reach a satisfactory development of the project. This plan will
include:
• the installation of a new GIS at SALEM, to serve RODOS and other support
systems, and integration of required fixed databases;
• the connection of some on-line databases (radiological, meteorological)
which are accessible at SALEM. We will start connecting NPP local
meteorological stations, and then we will extend the connection to other
meteorological and radiological monitoring systems;
• determining the interface between RODOS and other SALEM systems.
Mainly, we intent to connect RODOS to the plant analysers systems (these
systems, currently available at SALEM, permit the evaluation of the
operational status and the calculation and forecast of source terms);
• participation in emergency exercises both at national and international
levels, including those defined in DSSNET project;
• training of operators and system management specialists. Some operators
received training in the use of RODOS in courses organised by FZK in the
past. A staff member of CSN attended the course on RODOS in FZK in
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November 2000. Some others will attend the courses to be held in March
and in the autumn of 2001.
Use
In July 1999 CSN participated in the first RUG benchmark exercise. This
exercise focused on the first (urgent and intermediate) phases of an emergency
and on the near range. Unfortunately, the RODOS system at CSN was not fully
operational at the time of the exercise and it was no possible to make
calculations. Nevertheless we used the generic calculations provided by STUK
and combined them with the Spanish national model for nuclear emergencies
(planing zones for automatic countermeasures, specific intervention levels).
Graphical presentations, i.e. iso-dose curves, could be made with RODOS as its
Graphics Server was working. Conclusions of this exercise were presented
during the RUG meeting that was held in Rhodes in September 1999, and are
also included in the RUG report of the first benchmarking exercise (Ammann et
al., 1999). They primarily concerned the ability of RODOS to support decision-
makers in nuclear emergencies, but also some improvements to the RODOS
software were suggested.
Unfortunately, it was not possible for CSN to participate in the second RUG
benchmark exercise.
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4 DISCUSSION
To achieve the objectives set out in chapter 2, RUG established a WWW
homepage, planned and jointly performed two comparison exercises and
organised four meetings for RODOS users.
Technically, the Web page operated very well. State-of-the-art Internet
technology provided an efficient communication channel at low cost. It was
easy to make announcements and discuss unresolved issues (discussion forum)
and to store and retrieve any kind of information in arbitrary formats
(document archive). The page was intended to replace, whenever beneficial,
mutual e-mail communications with an open discussion forum. But apparently
there was a barrier to overcome in regard to publicly discussing unresolved
issues and members of RUG stuck to traditional means of communication. On
the other hand, it is obvious that such a page needs a relatively frequent
update and a lively discussion in order to be revisited, i.e. there must be a
critical mass of subscribers in order to succeed. Because of the rather small
membership base of the RUG, this was hard to achieve. Furthermore, the
RODOS project maintained a Web page and, being the page of the relevant R&D
community, this was considered the page for 'first-hand-information'.
Therefore it is recommended that only one central page for dependant projects
be maintained and that it should be frequently updated.
The main objectives of the jointly performed exercises were achieved. The
accident scenarios, applied methods and settings of the exercises can be
utilised in future exercises, provided that they are critically revised and
modified to suit the objectives. A common scenario proved to be an appropriate
means of highlighting issues that needed to be discussed between users and
developers. Secondly, jointly performed exercises stimulated the users to share
their operational knowledge of RODOS.
Operating RODOS while preparing for and during an exercise stimulates and
motivates the end users to maintain and further develop DSSs. It also
maintains activity in the field of emergency preparedness. In order to ensure
the necessary commitment of the participants, it is important that exercises
are as realistic as possible. However, the planning, organisation and
implementation of such exercises are time consuming, laborious and
expensive. It is therefore very important that the maximum benefit is achieved
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from such exercises. The experience from the RUG exercises suggests that the
following points need to be considered in greater depth before future exercises
are undertaken. When designing the accident scenario, performing the
exercise and assessing the results the use of analytical evaluation methods
could be better employed, e.g., prescriptive and descriptive decision analysis
techniques. The writing of scientific reports that document various aspects of
the exercises could also enhance the benefits derived from them. It would be
useful in this context to formulate a framework that could provide scientific
levels of merits and guarantee the full documentation of the work and effort
invested. To reduce the workload in designing exercises for RODOS, all
opportunities to use RODOS in international exercises should be taken and the
results could be analysed at RODOS or DSSNET meetings. The inclusion of
directors and other high-ranking officials in the exercises would provide an
additional stimulus.
To maintain motivation and know-how in the field of emergency preparedness
it is essential that users can contribute to the development of models used in
DSSs, and whenever possible, participate in R&D work. Users with expertise
and responsibility in the field of emergency management have to be familiar
with the relevant models of the supporting DSS. They have also to be aware of
the level of reliability of the calculated results and the limits and conditions
applying to the model predictions. Models should be as simple as possible
while still retaining their suitability for emergency management or research.
A DSS must also be as flexible as possible, since organisation and national
procedures of emergency management vary from countries to country.
Throughout the period of the project, a number of key areas were addressed.
Many of these actions were initiated by RUG and will continue during the
DSSNET project:
• a survey on the possibility of obtaining numerical weather prediction data
at an European level for use within RODOS was carried out.  The results
indicated that different data formats, models, national terms, etc. exist
between countries;
• an initiative to collect 'neighbouring' NPP data (type, construction,
inventory/thermal energy);
STUK-A183
45
• an initiative to list errors and proposals for improvements at the RODOS
homepage;
• an initiative to support training courses and to provide miscellaneous
technical support etc.
To keep DSSs operational, there is a need for continuous on-going development.
This is emphasised by the rapid developments occurring in the field of
Information Technology. One important development would be the extension
of RODOS to include a standardised query language interface (e.g. SQL) and a
facility to use commercial geographic information systems (GIS).
Comprehensive real-time decision support systems like RODOS are recent
additions in the field of emergency management of nuclear accidents. To date
there is not much experience of the type of information they should supply or
the format to be used. Nuclear accidents occur infrequently and unexpectedly.
No two accidents are likely to be the same in regard to their consequences and
public reaction. A flexible and dynamic query interface is therefore required to
cope with this variability. For example, the assessment of contamination
through a particular pathway or a selection of pathways may be required; or
from a specific nuclide or a selection of nuclides. Assessments may be
requested to cover a specific time period, for a specific organ, age group etc.
Thus, it might be easier to define the content and form of the calculation
database within RODOS and to have an interactive SQL interface to provide
the results for these numerous and variable queries. To try and foresee all
possible combinations of assessment requests and to provide static selections
for all of these may prove too difficult.
There are software systems in operation and under development in end user
organisations that manage (store, retrieve, etc) measurement data and other
data with spatial information, e.g. demographic and product data, in relational
database management systems (RDBMS).  Such systems include Spatial WARE
systems to present the data on maps. It would be clearly advantageous to have
a standardised interface to such systems.
The Graphics System of RODOS provides only the most basic tools for display
and data analysis. For more advanced tasks data has to be exported to a full
featured GIS. To our knowledge, only a rather rudimentary method is available
at the moment to export calculated results, i.e. graphical output data can be
dumped to text files and imported, after some filtering, by another GIS. There
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is certainly a need to improve and 'standardise' the interface to a third party
GIS.
Many of the 'shortcomings' and difficulties experienced in the work of the RUG
were due to the fact that the project was initiated at a rather immature
development stage of the RODOS software. This caused some extra work and
delay. Nevertheless it brought together, for the first time, the users and
developers, which was a rewarding experience for both. The developers
received the feedback they needed for the achievement of their goal, i.e.
providing a system that is fit for use in emergency centres. The users got
demonstrations of the latest additional features to the system, experience in
using them and a formal means of providing their comments on the system to
the developers.
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